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Abstract Could interacting mindreaders be in a position to know things which
they would be unable to know if they were manifestly passive observers? This paper
argues that they could. Mindreading is sometimes reciprocal: the mindreader’s
target reciprocates by taking the mindreader as a target for mindreading. The paper
explains how such reciprocity can significantly narrow the range of possible
interpretations of behaviour where mindreaders are, or appear to be, in a position to
interact. A consequence is that revisions and extensions are needed to standard
theories of the evidential basis of mindreading. The view also has consequences for
understanding how abilities to interact combined with comparatively simple forms
of mindreading may explain the emergence, in evolution or development, of
sophisticated forms of social cognition.
Keywords Mindreading  Theory of mind  Joint action  Interpretation 
Goal ascription  Interaction  Social cognition
1 On the evidential basis of mindreading
Mindreading is the process of identifying thoughts and actions on the basis of bodily
movements, somewhat as reading is the process of identifying propositions on the
basis of inscriptions (Apperly, 2010, p. 4). Contrast a mindreader who is, or appears
to be, capable of interacting with her targets and a mindreader who can manifestly
only observe. Is it possible that the interacting mindreader is in a position to know
things which she would be unable to know if she were unable to interact with her
targets? Our aim in this paper is to argue that the answer is a qualified ‘yes’.
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The question is about the evidential basis of mindreading, not about what sorts of
mechanisms are involved. While philosophers have engaged with questions about
mechanisms (such as whether mindreading involves a process of simulation or of
theorizing or some combination of the two), comparatively little effort has recently
been devoted to issues about what evidence could ground mindreading.
Our question is part of a broader question, What is the evidential basis for
ascriptions of thought and action and how does the evidence support the ascriptions?
The most sustained attempts to answer this question, Davidson’s (1984, 1990),
Lewis’ (1974) and Dennett’s (1987), do not exploit the possibility of interaction.
The evidence and principles they consider are available to manifestly passive
observers. So on their theories, a purely passive mindreader observing from behind
a one-way mirror is on a par with a mindreader who, actually or apparently, could
interact with those she seeks to interpret. The two are on a par in this sense: in
principle the same evidence could be available to each, and each can exploit the
routes to knowledge in moving from evidence to ascriptions of thought and action.
Of course these theories are all compatible with the idea that interaction might be
useful for mindreading in practice. But on these theories interaction makes no
difference to what can in principle be known. In this paper we aim to show that
mindreaders actually or apparently capable of interacting with their targets are at an
advantage not only in practice but also in theory. Their ascriptions could exploit
routes to knowledge which would be unavailable if they were entirely passive
observers.
Why suppose, in advance of considering the details, that interacting mindreaders
might know more? A mindreader’s target is often also a mindreader and may
sometimes reciprocate by taking the mindreader as a target for mindreading. It
ought to be possible, in mindreading, to make use of this reciprocity. But how could
such reciprocity facilitate mindreading? If we assume the mindreader is merely
observing her target, that there is manifestly no potential for interaction, then it
seems that any way of exploiting reciprocity would involve higher-order ascriptions.
The mindreader would ascribe to her target beliefs (say) about the mindreader’s own
beliefs and other mental states. And if her target reciprocates, she might escalate by
ascribing to the target beliefs about her own beliefs about the target’s beliefs about
her beliefs. While this might be useful in some situations, the nesting this approach
requires quickly becomes dauntingly complex. And the basic intuition about
reciprocal mindreading goes unsatisfied. Reciprocal mindreading should sometimes
result in something like a meeting of minds rather than an escalation of higher-order
ascriptions. Perhaps fully exploiting reciprocity in mindreading requires the
mindreaders to be in a position to interact with each other; perhaps in some cases
being or appearing poised to interact can somehow enable mindreaders to exploit
reciprocity without first having to ascribe higher-order mental states. This is the
hunch we develop in what follows.
Even if the hunch turns out to be right, why investigate it? One reason is that the
investigation will enable us to revise and extend existing accounts of the evidential
basis of mindreading in ways that make them more accurate and comprehensive.
Another motive concerns the emergence, in evolution or in development, of
mindreading. Several researchers have offered quite general conjectures about how
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interaction might explain the emergence of sophisticated forms of cognition. One
view is that needs to interact with others have driven and shaped some aspects of
cognition.1 We shall not speak to this view here. Another view is that abilities to
interact with others may have fostered the emergence in evolution—or, on a
different view, in development—of sophisticated forms of cognition including
social cognition and, in particular, mindreading.2 Studying how interaction broadens
the evidential basis of mindreading will eventually point to one way of filling in
some details on just how interaction might facilitate the emergence of sophisticated
forms of mindreading.
Our claim needs to be qualified in several ways. First, we should highlight
something already explicit but not yet emphasised: the claim applies not just to
mindreaders who actually could interact with their targets but also to mindreaders
who appear to their targets to be potential interaction partners (even if they are not).
Trading the risk of a minor misunderstanding for concision we use the term
‘interacting mindreader’ to refer to both groups; similarly, references to mindread-
ers who ‘only observe’ must be understood as excluding those who appear to their
targets to be interaction partners. Only cases involving the first group—mindreaders
who actually could interact—are likely to be of wider interest. Any application of
our claim to understanding evolution or development is bound to focus on cases
where mindreaders actually could interact with their targets.
A second qualification concerns the scope of mindreading. In most discussions of
mindreading, the focus is on ascription of beliefs and other mental states to
individuals. But in what follows we shall focus on the ascription of goals to actions.
Some might claim that goal ascription is not mindreading, perhaps because
identifying relations between actions and the outcomes to which they are directed
does not necessarily involve ascribing mental states. Our view is consistent with this
claim (and with its negation). Evidence for ascriptions of belief and of other mental
states often includes the occurrence (and non-occurrence) of goal-directed actions.
Identifying these actions typically requires goal ascription. In some cases, then,
evidence for the ascription of a goal will indirectly support the ascription of a belief
or other mental state—the evidence will support a goal ascription which will in turn
support the ascription of a belief (say) to the agent of the action. Accordingly, even
those who deny that goal ascription is mindreading should agree that sometimes
evidence for goal ascription is indirectly evidence for ascription of belief and other
mental states. So whether or not goal ascription is deemed to be mindreading, an
individual’s access to evidence for mindreading depends in part on her access to
evidence for goal ascription. Our plan is to show that interacting mindreaders could
exploit routes to knowledge of the goals of others’ actions which are not available to
mere observers. In doing this we will be showing that mindreaders poised to interact
1 E.g. Knoblich and Sebanz (2006, p. 103) suggest that ‘functions traditionally considered hallmarks of
individual cognition originated through the need to interact with others’ and that ‘perception, action, and
cognition are grounded in social interaction.’
2 Moll and Tomasello (2007, p. 1) argue for the ‘Vygotskian Intelligence Hypothesis’ according to which
‘the unique aspects of human cognition…were driven by, or even constituted by, social co-operation.’ See




with others could know things about their minds which they might not otherwise be
in a position to know.
Developing these ideas requires us to fill in some background on goal ascription
and its limits, as well as on notions of goal-directed interaction. Readers impatient
to get to the central idea might skip to Sect. 5.
2 Goal ascription
Purposive action is action directed to the realisation of one or more outcomes. Goal
ascription is the process of identifying to which outcomes others’ purposive actions
are directed. To illustrate, suppose that Hannah kicks a ball thereby both preventing
her sisters from scoring and also breaking a window. Asked about the episode,
Hannah might protest, truthfully, that the goal of her action was not to break the
window but only to reverse the others’ advance. As this illustrates, among the actual
and possible outcomes of an action, only some are outcomes to which the action is
directed. Goal ascription is the process of identifying those outcomes.
We focus on goal ascription partly because this simplifies our argument, but
mainly because goal ascription is widely thought to be among the very earliest
components of mindreading to emerge (or, if goal ascription is not mindreading,
then it is a late precursor).3 By showing that interacting mindreaders may have
access to evidence for goal ascriptions which is unavailable to those who merely
observe, we will eventually be able to indicate ways in which interaction could
facilitate the emergence, in evolution or development, of more sophisticated forms
of mindreading.4
Because goal ascription has received little attention, in this section we shall
briefly review some potential benefits of being able to identify goals and then
consider what sort of evidence might support goal ascription.
It is a familiar idea that goal ascription enables one to learn from others’
successes. For example, if you know or can guess that another agent’s actions are
directed to opening a nut, you may then be in a position to infer that the unfamiliar
pattern of actions she is performing constitute a means to open nuts. A slightly less
familiar idea is that goal ascription enables one to learn from others’ failures as well
as their successes. For example, suppose that while you are searching for some
peanuts another agent attempts but fails to reach for a closed container. In some
circumstances, if you know that the goal of the agent’s action was to obtain the
peanuts then you now have evidence as to where they might be.5 This is one
illustration of how goal ascription could in principle enable us to learn from others’
failures (Want & Harris, 2001 offer another).
3 See, for example, Gergely et al. (1995) and Woodward (1998). See also Baillargeon et al. (2010,
p. 111, Box 1) on two subsystems and Povinelli (2001) on ‘behavioural regularities’ whose specification
sometimes appears to involve goal-directed action.
4 There are various ways of understanding the idea that mindreading may come in several forms, some
less conceptually or cognitively demanding than others. For a range of views, see Apperly and Butterfill
(2009), Call and Tomasello (2005), Doherty (2006), O’Neill (2005) and Wellman and Phillips (2001).
5 Hare and Tomasello (2004) exploit this fact in testing chimpanzees’ abilities to ascribe goals.
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Goal ascription enables one to predict and manipulate others’ actions. If you
know that an agent is engaged in a sequence of actions whose eventual goal involves
retrieving some object, you may be able to predict that the agent will go to where
the object is at some point.6 Equally, in some cases knowing this much about the
goal of another’s actions many enable you to assist them, either by retrieving the
object for them or else by revealing the object’s location to them.7
Goal ascription is also instrumental for ascribing propositional attitudes. We have
already mentioned (in Sect. 2) that such ascriptions often involve confirming
predictions about actions which in turn typically requires identifying the goals of
those actions. In addition, knowing which outcomes an action is directed to may
constrain hypotheses about what an agent intends as well as potentially providing
information concerning what the agent knows, believes or desires. For example, if
we know that the goal of an agent’s action is to retrieve some peanuts, and if we also
know where all the peanuts are, we may be able to infer that she does not know
where the peanuts are, or that she falsely believes that some of the peanuts are over
there.8 (Of course this can also work the other way: information about an agent’s
beliefs or other mental states may support conclusions about her goals. Belief- and
goal-ascriptions are mutually constraining.)
Now that we have reviewed some of the benefits goal ascription can bring, what
evidence could support ascriptions of goals to actions? Consider the claim that
knowledgeably identifying the goals to which actions are directed depends on
knowledge of the agents’ intentions which in turn depends on knowledge of their
beliefs, desires and other mental states. If this claim were true, it would make no
sense to discuss the evidential basis of goal ascription except in discussing the
evidential basis of mindreading more generally. However, the falsity of this claim is
presupposed in both developmental and comparative research on goal ascription.9
And we know of no compelling reason for taking this claim to be true. After all, it is
consistent with rejecting the claim to recognize that ascriptions of goals to actions
constrain, and are constrained by, ascriptions of intentions and other mental states.
The existence of such constraints does not show that one could not know something
about the goals of actions while knowing nothing about the agents’ mental states.
Further, there do seem to be situations where knowledge of agents’ goals does not
require any knowledge of their mental states. For instance, suppose that two people
are sitting opposite each other at a low table which is sparsely populated with
objects. The objects are all out in the open; manifestly, both can clearly see them. If
one person reaches to grasp one of these objects (the duck, say), must the other
ascribe beliefs or other mental states in order to knowledgeably identify the goal of
her action as that of grasping the duck? On the face of it, she need not. Even if she
6 For an application see Hare et al. (2001).
7 For a paradigm involving the former see Warneken et al. (2007); on the latter, see Liszkowski et al.
(2008).
8 Wimmer and Mayringer (1998) exploit this possibility in testing children’s abilities to ascribe false
beliefs.
9 Compare Gergely et al. (1995), Woodward (1998) and Penn and Povinelli (2007) among many others.
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had no ability to ascribe mental states, it seems she might nevertheless be in a
position to identify the goal of the other’s action.
While not decisive, these considerations are perhaps sufficient to motivate
exploring what evidence might support goal ascription. According to what Csibra
and Gergely call ‘the principle of rational action’,
‘An action can be explained by a goal state if, and only if, it is seen as the most
justifiable action towards that goal state that is available within the constraints
of reality.’10
Taking this idea as a rough starting point, we propose that these facts:
1. Action a is directed to some goal;
2. Actions of a’s type are normally capable of being means of realising outcomes
of G’s type in situations with the salient (to any concerned) features of this
situation;
3. No alternative type of action is both typically available to agents of this type and also
such that actions of this type would be normally be significantly better11 means of
realising outcome G in situations with the salient features of this situation;
4. The occurrence of outcome G is typically desirable for agents of this type;
and
5. There is no other outcome, G0, the occurrence of which would be at least comparably
desirable for agents of this type and where (2) and (3) both hold of G0 and a
may jointly constitute defeasible evidence for the conclusion that:
6. G is a goal to which action a is directed.
We suggest that the above inference, from (1)–(5) to (6), is a route to knowledge of
the goals of actions in this sense: in some cases it would be possible to know the
premises without already knowing the conclusion; and, in some of those cases,
knowing the premises could put one in a position to know the conclusion.12
Why accept this? Suppose that (1)–(5) are facts and that G is not a goal to which
action a is directed. Then from (1) we know that a has a goal, call it G0. And from (5) we
can infer that either (i) the action, a, was not of a type that is normally capable of being
a means to the outcome to which it was directed, or (ii) a significantly better (for
instance, a more reliable or less effortful) means of achieving G0 is typically available
10 Csibra and Gergely (1998, p. 255); cf. Csibra et al. (2003). A related but different ‘principle of
efficiency’ has been formulated by Southgate et al. (2008, p. 1061): ‘goal attribution requires that agents
expend the least possible amount of energy within their motor constraints to achieve a certain end.’
11 An action of type a0 is a better means of realising outcome G in a given situation than an action of type
a if, for instance, actions of type a0 normally involve less effort than actions of type a in situations with
the salient features of this situation and everything else is equal; or if, for example, actions of type a0 are
normally more likely to realise outcome G than actions of type a in situations with the salient features of
this situation and everything else is equal.
12 Knowledge of the conclusion may not require explicit knowledge of what is salient to others, what is
desirable to them, or what makes actions better for them. It is arguably sufficient that the individual
ascribing a goal is entitled to rely on being sufficiently similar to the target of her ascription with respect
to these things.
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to agents of this type, or (iii) G0’s occurrence would be significantly less desirable than
G’s occurrence for agents of this type. So the agent’s action fell short of being
appropriate or optimal in some way, or the agent has atypical preferences or
capabilities, or the situation is not normal. While any of these is possible—and perhaps
in some cases even to be expected—there are also circumstances in which it is
reasonable to suppose that none obtains, that the situation will be normal in relevant
respects, that agents will have typical preferences and capabilities and that they will act
in ways that are appropriate and (in the limited sense in play here) optimal. In such
circumstances, the above inference can serve as a route to knowledge of the goals of
actions. The existence of this route to knowledge shows that goal ascription doesn’t
invariably depend on mental state ascription.
Note that we are not suggesting that the above inference captures the only route
to knowledge of the goals of actions, or that it provides anything like a
comprehensive theory of the evidential basis of goal ascription. Clearly it does
not. The inference has only limited applications. For example, it cannot be used
when an action is the best available means of achieving two or more comparably
desirable outcomes. Fortunately the argument that follows does not depend on
having a comprehensive theory of evidence for goal ascription. The point of this
brief discussion was only to consider the sort of evidence that can bear on goal
ascription and to show that even those incapable of ascribing mental states like
belief might nevertheless have evidence sufficient for goal ascription.
Our narrow aim in what follows is to show that some routes to knowledge of the
goals of actions are available only to interacting mindreaders and not to those who
merely observe. Having in this section introduced goal ascription as a topic, the next
step is to identify an obstacle to acquiring knowledge of the goals of actions, one
which we will eventually show can be avoided where mindreaders can (or appear
able to) interact with their targets.
3 The problem of opaque means
While we lack a detailed theory of the evidential basis of goal ascription, it is certain
that the evidence for goal ascription sometimes includes considerations about which
ends actions are means to. Suppose an observer faces an action but cannot identify
ends to which it could be a means. This may prevent her from recognizing the
action’s goal13 by depriving her of evidence. To illustrate, contrast two cases of tool
use. In one case, someone uses a reamer to juice a lime; in the other, someone else
scores shag with a lame to prevent a loaf from cracking. Without communication,
repetition or convention, an observer familiar with reamers but not lames may be
able to identify the goal of the first action only. As this illustrates, ignorance about
to which ends actions are means can be an obstacle to goal ascription. Call this the
problem of opaque means.
13 It is possible that some actions have more than one goal. To reduce parenthetical qualifications we
shall write as if actions had only one goal. All of our key claims and arguments are consistent with the
possibility of actions with more than one goal.
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We are not suggesting that no observer could ever identify the goal of any action
she fails to recognise as a means to achieving that goal. Of course opaque means are
not in every case an insurmountable obstacle to goal ascription, and they may only
rarely be a problem for human adults with sophisticated social skills. Our point is
neither novel nor surprising: opaque means sometimes deprive mindreaders of
evidence and so prevent goal ascription. This is more likely to happen where goal
ascribers lack sophistication in mindreading, communication and culture.
Some of the most plausibly unique aspects of human cognition depend on our
abilities to recognise the goals of novel behaviours involving tools, and of
communicative gestures. The problem of opaque means is likely to arise in both
cases if goal ascription is based entirely on observation (so that the possibility of
interaction is ignored) and if the goal ascriber lacks sophisticated social skills. We
have just seen an illustration of how the problem of opaque means arises where tools
are used to unfamiliar ends. Relatedly, it is also likely to arise where actions involve
multiple steps that do not form a familiar sequence, can occur in various orders and
can be interspersed among other activities; as in preparing spirit from grain, for
example.
The problem of opaque means also affects communicative actions because these
characteristically have goals which the actions are means to realising only because
others recognise them as means to realising those goals (a Gricean circle). To
illustrate, consider an experiment from Hare and Tomasello (2004, experiment 3)
whose two main conditions are depicted in Fig. 1. The pictures in the figure stand
for what participants, who were chimpanzees, saw. The question was whether
participants would be able to work out which of two containers concealed a reward.
In the condition depicted in the left panel, participants saw a chimpanzee trying but
failing to reach for the correct container. Participants had no problem getting the
reward in this case, suggesting that they understood the goal of the failed reach. In
the condition depicted in the right panel, a human pointed at the correct container.
Participants did not reliably get the reward in this case, suggesting that they failed to
understand the goal of the pointing action.14 This may be because of the problem of
opaque means. One theoretically possible explanation of these findings is that the
participants could identify to which end a failed reach might be a means, but not to
which end a communicative gesture might be a means.15 Whatever the truth about
the chimpanzees’ performance, this possibility illustrates how the problem of
opaque means can be an obstacle to exploiting communicative gestures.
This, then, is the problem of opaque means: failures to identify to which ends
actions are means can impair goal ascription. The problem is potentially a problem
for mindreaders given the standard, purely observational theories of mindreading.
Note that it is not our intention to suggest that the problem of opaque means is a
14 The contrast between the two conditions is not due merely to the fact that one involves a human and
the other a chimpanzee. Participants were also successful when the failed reach was executed by a human
rather than another chimpanzee (Hare & Tomasello, 2004, experiment 1).
15 Hare and Tomasello (2004, p. 580) consider several explanations for their findings including ‘the
hypothesis that chimpanzees do not understand the communicative intent of a cooperative-
communicative experimenter’. Moll and Tomasello (2007, pp. 5–7) argue for a hypothesis along these
lines by appeal to a range of related findings.
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problem for theories of mindreading; what matters for our purposes is only that it is
a potential problem for mindreaders.
That the problem of opaque means exists is the first step in our argument that
theories of the evidential basis of mindreading based on pure observation are less
powerful than theories taking into account the possibility of interaction. They are
less powerful in this sense: some routes to knowledge of the goals of actions are
available only where a theory of the evidential basis of mindreading takes the
possibility of interaction into account. In what follows we shall explain how being
able to interact with another sometimes makes available a route to knowledge of the
goals of her actions which avoids the problem of opaque means. This will support
our claim that an interacting mindreader might be in a position to know things
which she would be unable to know if she were only observing.
4 Interactions involving distributive goals
We aim eventually is to defend this claim: there are routes to knowledge of the goals
of others’ actions which are closed to mindreaders who merely observe their targets
but open to mindreaders who are, or appear to be, capable of interacting with their
targets. As a preliminary to defending this claim, we need to specify which types of
interaction are relevant. That is the aim of this section.
Let us stipulate that an outcome is a distributive goal of two or more agents’
actions just if two conditions are met. First, this outcome is one to which each
agent’s actions are individually directed. Second, each agent’s actions are related to
the outcome in such a way that it is possible for all the agents (not just any agent, all
of them together) to succeed in bringing about this outcome.
To illustrate, suppose that, while doing some gardening, we find a turnip too big
for any of us to easily pull out of the ground alone. We each individually intend that
we all pull up the enormous turnip and we act on this intention.16 There is a single
Fig. 1 A failed reach (left) and a helpful point (right). Reproduced from Hare and Tomasello (2004,
p. 557, Fig. 4)




outcome, freeing the turnip, to which each of our actions is individually directed.
And it is possible for all of us to succeed in bringing about this outcome. So this
outcome is a distributive goal of our actions.
Note that our actions could have a distributive goal even without us each
intending that we do something. As another variation on the turnip-pulling story,
suppose that we each individually intend to contribute to pulling up the turnip or
pull it up. Such intentions are agent-neutral in this sense: relative to such an
intention an agent could succeed by acting alone and she also could succeed by
acting with unspecified other agents. Plausibly our having these intentions is
sufficient for our actions to have a distributive goal. For in virtue of these intentions
each of our actions is directed to the turnip’s extraction, and this is an outcome
relative to which it is possible that all of our actions succeed.
In defining ‘distributive goal’ we stipulated that it must be possible for all of the
agents of actions with a distributive goal to succeed relative to that outcome.
Consider a variation on our first turnip-pulling story. Instead of each intending that
we pull up the turnip, we each simply intend to pull up the turnip. In this case, some
might claim that this amounts to us each intending that he or she pulls up the turnip.
And this claim might be taken to support the further claim that there is no outcome
to which each of our actions are directed in virtue of our having these intentions
such that we could all succeed relative to this outcome.
We take no stand on whether either claim is correct. For our purposes all that
matters is that there are distributive goals. And the existence of distributive goals
follows from the possibility of each of us intending that we pull up the turnip (rather
than simply intending to pull it up), and from the possibility of each of us intending
to contribute to pulling up the turnip or pull it up.
For two agents’ actions to have a distributive goal it is sufficient that their actions
constitute a joint action (at least this is true on almost any account of joint action).17
However, the converse does not hold. As the first variation of the turnip-pulling
story indicates, two or more agents’ actions may have a distributive goal even
though the agents do not know about each others’ intentions or actions. In fact our
actions might have a distributive goal even though none of us is aware of this, or
even of the others’ existence. (We resist the temptation to contrive a truly gigantic
turnip and a pitch dark, very stormy night; readers can probably guess how this
would go.) One consequence of this is that two or more agents’ actions may have a
distributive goal even though they are not engaged in joint action (at least not on any
standard account of joint action).18
17 We know of two definitions of joint action on which it is not straightforward that all joint actions
involve distributive goals. One is provided is provided by Ludwig (2007, p. 366) and quoted in footnote
18; the other is due to Sebanz et al. (2006, p. 70). According to Sebanz and colleagues’ (2006, p. 70)
‘working definition’, ‘joint action can be regarded as any form of social interaction whereby two or more
individuals coordinate their actions in space and time to bring about a change in the environment’. On one
way of reading this, the latter part is equivalent to ‘a change in the environment is such that: to bring it
about two or more individuals coordinate their actions’; this does suggest that the actions have a
distributive goal. On other standard accounts it is straightforward that joint action involves distributive
goals. Compare Bratman (1992, pp. 329-31), Searle (2002, pp. 96-97) and Gilbert (2009, pp. 168-169).
18 On many accounts of joint action, each agent involved in a joint action must believe, expect or know
something about the jointness of her action. See Bratman (1993, p. 103), Butterfill (2012, p. 40), Kutz
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The notion of a distributive goal is a narrowly technical one. In introducing this
notion by stipulation we are not aiming to match anyone’s intuitions about anything.
What matters for now is just that the definition is theoretically coherent and that it is
possible for actions to have distributive goals. Our aim in introducing distributive
goals is to capture a minimal requirement on the sort of interactions relevant to
characterising a route to knowledge of the goals of actions available only to
interacting mindreaders.
5 Your-goal-is-my-goal
If a mindreader is able to interact with her targets, if she is not limited to merely
observing them, how might this enable her to exploit a route to knowledge of the
goals of their actions? The answer hinges on interactions involving distributive
goals (as defined on page 10).
Here is an intuitive idea that doesn’t quite work: if a mindreader is engaged in an
interaction with her target that involves a distributive goal, it may be easy for the
mindreader to know what the goal of her target’s actions is because this goal is the
goal of her own actions. So if she knows the goal of her own actions and she knows
that she is engaged with her target in an interaction involving a distributive goal,
then she already knows what the goal of her target’s actions are.
Of course this intuitive idea is no use it stands. For the inference it captures relies
on the premise that the mindreader and her target are engaged in actions with a
distributive goal. But for the mindreader to know this premise it seems she must
already know which goal her target’s actions are directed to.
Fortunately there is a way around this. For there are various cues which signal
that one agent is prepared to engage in some joint action or other with another, and
joint actions involve distributive goals.
Seeing you struggling to get your twin pram onto a bus and noticing you have the
haggard look of a new parent, a passing stranger grabs the front wheels and makes
eye contact with you, raising her eyebrows and smiling. (The noise of the street
rules out talking.) In this way she signals that she is about to act jointly with you.
Since you are fully committed to getting your pram onto the bus, you know what the
sole goal of your own actions will be. But you also know that the stranger will
engage in joint action with you, which means that, taken together, her actions and
your actions will have a distributive goal. This may enable you to infer the goal of
the stranger’s imminent actions: her goal is your goal, to get the pram onto the bus.
Our suggestion, then, is that the following inference characterises a route to
knowledge of others’ goals:
Footnote 18 continued
(2000, p. 10), Miller (2001, p. 56) and Roth (2004, p. 361). Exceptions include Pacherie (2011) and
Ludwig (2007). According to Ludwig (2007, p. 366), ‘The concept of a joint action as such is just that of
an event of which there are multiple agents’. Depending on what events are and what it is to be the agent
of an event, it may turn out that, on Ludwig’s definition, our actions’ having a distributive goal is
sufficient for us to be engaged in joint action.
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1. You are about to attempt to engage in some joint action19 or other with me.
2. I am not about to change the single goal to which my actions will be directed.
Therefore:
3. A goal of your actions will be my goal, the goal I now envisage that my actions
will be directed to.
Call this inference your-goal-is-my-goal. To say that it characterises a route to
knowledge implies two things. First, in some cases it is possible to know the
premises, 1 and 2, without already knowing the conclusion, 3. Second, in some of
those cases knowing the premises would put one in a position to know the
conclusion. We shall consider these points in turn
Is it ever possible to know the premises without first knowing the conclusion?
Consider the first premise. Sometimes in the right contexts an individual can
recognize in another’s facial expressions, engaging gestures or synchronized bodily
movements that she is about to attempt to engage in joint action with her. Exploiting
these indicators does not typically depend on knowing the particular contents of any
beliefs, desires or goals. Expressions, gestures and movements can naturally
indicate imminent jointness in much the way they can also naturally indicate
emotions.20 Of course these indicators do not guarantee that others are about to
attempt to engage in joint action. But they are sufficiently reliable to ground
knowledge in some cases. The existence of such indicators shows that knowing the
first premise of the above inference does not require already knowing which
particular goals the other’s actions will be directed to.
Not everything needs to rest on indicators, however. It is sometimes possible to
know that others are about to attempt to engage in joint action with you even
without relying on such indicators. Thanks to widespread dispositions to act jointly,
in some situations it is reasonable to take for granted that others will act jointly. For
example, this is often so for children struggling with a coat while surrounded by
family or familiar adults. And in at least some subcultures people using public
transport can reasonably take for granted that, within limits, those around them will
act jointly with them when the need is clear. Of course dispositions to engage in
joint action may vary between cultural groups and situations. This may be fatal for
the frequent traveller, but for others what matters is not whether the dispositions are
universal but only that they are sufficiently widespread to be predictable.
Turning to the second point, could knowing the premises of the your-goal-is-my-
goal inference ever put one in a position to know the conclusion? Of course the
inference is not deductive and will only work when certain background conditions
are met. These background conditions include the other having largely true beliefs
concerning which goal your actions are or will be directed to. After all, another
19 We leave open the issue of how joint action is to be characterised subject only to the requirement that
all joint actions must involve distributive goals (see further footnote 17). Attempts to characterise joint
action in ways relevant to explaining development include Tollefsen (2005), Carpenter (2009), Pacherie
(2011) and Butterfill (2012). The last of these not only shows how a primitive form of joint action can be
characterised without ascriptions of higher-order mental states but also shares our focus on relations
between actions and goals rather than between agents and intentions.
20 Ideas along these lines are suggested by the discussion of emergent coordination in Knoblich et al.
(2010).
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agent may attempt to act jointly with you while being entirely mistaken about the
goals of your actions. Where this happens, the premises of the inference might be
true but the conclusion false. We shall return to this point later (in Sect. 9). For now,
note that in some situations there is no requirement to consider this possibility, as
for instance when stereotypes, conventions or simplicity should and do make the
goal of your actions obvious to the other agent.
As well as having true beliefs concerning the goal of your actions, the other must
be willing to pursue this goal. This is not guaranteed by the truth of the premises of
the inference. For all these require, the other might be aware of the goal you
envisage but attempting to initiate a joint action directed to another, quite different
goal. Perhaps, for example, the other disapproves of your project and is offering to
act with you as part of an attempt to divert you.21 Note, however, that it is only
reasonable for the other to attempt a joint action with you where you are in a
position to know which goal the joint action would be directed to. If no alternative
goal ought to be salient to you and the other has done nothing to make an alternative
salient, then it is not unreasonable for you to ignore the possibility that the other is
unwilling to pursue the goal to which your actions will be directed. This might
easily be the case where, for instance, you are in a tidy kitchen patiently chopping
your way through a large pile of carrots; it is perhaps less likely to be the case in a
more cluttered kitchen where you are surrounded by all kinds of potential
ingredients in different states of preparation. In general, how strongly the truth of
the premises of the your-goal-is-my-goal inference supports the truth of the
conclusion will depend (among other conditions) on how salient alternative goals to
which your actions might be directed ought to be to you.
Given these and perhaps other background conditions, that others are about to
attempt to engage in joint action with you is sometimes sufficient reason to hold that
you will end up acting jointly with them even where the goal to which your actions
will be directed is already fixed.
In short, then, the two requirements for the your-goal-is-my-goal inference to
characterise a route to knowledge are met. In some cases it is possible to know the
premises without already knowing the conclusion thanks to natural expressions of
willingness to engage in joint action. And knowing the premises sometimes puts one
in a position to know the conclusion thanks to the fact that, when things are going
well, another’s willingness to engage in joint action with you can be based on an
accurate assessment of the goals of your actions.
In principle, exploiting your-goal-is-my-goal does not require actually being in a
position to interact with the target of goal ascription. It is sufficient (and would be
necessary but for some special cases) to be taken by the target to be in a position to
interact. Our concern, however, is with cases that are likely to be important for
understanding development or evolution. This motivates a focus on goal ascribers of
limited sophistication who lack both deep insight into others’ minds and fully-
fledged communicative abilities. Such individuals are unlikely to be able to contrive
or exploit situations in which they only appear to be in a position to interact with
their targets. When we come to applications of your-goal-is-my-goal, the relevant
21 We are grateful to anonymous referee for emphasising this point.
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cases will be those in which a goal ascriber is manifestly in a position to interact
with her target.
We should also acknowledge that mindreaders who only observe can make use of
the premise about joint action that your-goal-is-my-goal depends on. Knowing that
the target of their mindreading is about to attempt to engage in joint action with
another agent might enable them to identify the goal of their target’s actions. We
return to this issue in Sect. 8. For now what matters is just that only interacting
mindreaders can exploit your-goal-is-my-goal.
The your-goal-is-my-goal route to knowledge is characterised by an inference.
However, exploiting this route to knowledge may not require actually making the
inference or knowing the premises. Depending on what knowing requires, it may be
sufficient to believe the conclusion because one has reliably detected a situation in
which the premises of the inference are true; it may not be necessary to think of this
situation as a situation where the premises are true, nor even to be able to think of it in
this way. Our aim in identifying the your-goal-is-my-goal inference is not to defend a
detailed hypothesis about mechanisms of mindreading. Instead our present concerns
are limited to a normative question about the evidential basis of mindreading. The
your-goal-is-my-goal inference matters not because it describes exactly how anyone
actually assigns goals (maybe it doesn’t) but because it characterises a route to
knowledge that is closed to mere observers and open to interacting mindreaders.
6 Avoiding the problem of opaque means
The problem of opaque means was this: failures to identify to which ends actions are
means can impair goal ascription (see Sect. 3). Showing how your-goal-is-my-goal
makes it possible to avoid this problem is a way of demonstrating the potential value
of interaction for mindreading.
In our earlier example a novice parent is struggling to lift his heavy twin pram
onto a bus when a stranger joins in and they lift the pram together. Suppose the
stranger starts tipping the pram in a way that the novice parent fails to recognise as a
means, indeed the only means, of getting it onto the bus. Outside the context of joint
action, failure to realise that the action is a means to getting the pram onto the bus
might have the consequence that the parent’s evidence on balance supports the
conclusion that the goal of the stranger’s actions is to take the pram off the bus.
(Perhaps the stranger is impatient to get onto the bus herself.) But in the context of
joint action, your-goal-is-my goal gives the parent additional evidence for supposing
that, even though the stranger’s actions do not seem to him to be a means to getting
the pram onto the bus, this really is the goal of her actions. Of course this additional
evidence will not always outweigh other evidence. But it will do sometimes, and
this is all we need. We have identified evidence for goal ascription that is available
independently of a goal ascriber’s knowing which ends actions are means to, and we
have illustrated how this will sometimes enable interacting mindreaders to avoid the
problem of opaque means
We saw earlier that the problem of opaque means may impair goal ascription
where actions involve novel uses for tools. How could your-goal-is-my-goal
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mitigate the problem in such cases? Imagine we are interacting with a young child,
Ayesha, and want her to understand how a new tool is used. It is difficult to convey
this to her directly. So we first get her interested in achieving an outcome that would
require the new tool, knowing that she will perform actions directed to achieving
this outcome. We then signal to Ayesha that we will act jointly with her. Now she is
in a position to know what the goal of our action will be when we deploy the tool.
She is able to identify this goal despite being unable to recognize it as an end to
which our tool-using action is a means. She is able to identify this goal because she
knows that this is her goal and that we were attempting to engage in joint action
with her. This is one illustration of how interacting mindreaders have at their
disposal ways of identifying the goals of actions involving novel uses of tools which
are unavailable to mindreaders who can only observe.
As this example indicates, exploiting your-goal-is-my-goal can shift the burden
of identifying goals from a mindreader to her target. In the example Ayesha is the
focal mindreader and we are her target; but her success in identifying the goal of our
actions depends on this, that our willingness to act jointly with her is based on our
knowledge of the goals of her actions. In purely observational mindreading, the
target’s beliefs about the goals of the mindreader’s actions are not normally relevant
(except, of course, when the mindreader is ascribing such beliefs). But interacting
mindreaders who rely on your-goal-is-my-goal thereby rely on their targets having
correctly identified the goals of their actions. Of course this is sometimes a reason
not to rely on your-goal-is-my-goal. But where the target understands relevant
means-ends relations, such as actions involving novel tools, the your-goal-is-my-
goal route to knowledge of others’ goals may sometimes be the only option.
Here we have a first illustration of how interacting mindreaders can exploit
reciprocity without relying on ascriptions of higher-order mental states. The
mindreader’s knowledge of the goal of her target’s actions depends on the target’s
knowledge of the goal of the mindreader’s actions. What makes this dependence
possible is not each knowing that the other knows something about the goal of her
actions; it is the actual or apparent possibility of interaction.
The distant promise of all this is that understanding how interaction widens the
evidential basis for goal ascription and mindreading more generally may eventually
enable us to explain the origins, in evolution or development (and ideally both), of
abilities to learn novel and opaque uses for tools from others without assuming that rich
communicative skills or sophisticated forms of mindreading must already be present.
7 Communicative gestures
When introducing the problem of opaque means (in Sect. 3) we saw that it could
affect communicative actions. To illustrate this suggestion we drew on an
experiment by Hare and Tomasello (2004) in which chimpanzees had to find a
reward and were helped by being shown either a failed reach or a helpful point to
the target location. Strikingly, for chimpanzees the helpful point is no help at all—
even though it superficially resembles the failed reach, which did help. Taking this
paradigm as a case study, we want to suggest that your-goal-is-my-goal might
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enable us to understand how abilities to engage in joint action could be part of what
enables mindreaders to make the transition from a simple understanding of goals to
an early understanding communicative actions.22
Let us imagine ourselves as the chimpanzee for a moment. We witness the
pointing action. With our eyes we follow the point to a container (see Moll &
Tomasello, 2007, p. 6). So we do associate the pointing action with its target. But
we are no more likely to choose this container than the other in seeking the reward.
So we probably do not think of the pointing action as having any goal which would
clue us in to the relevance of the container it indicates. (In principle we might
perfectly understand the pointing action while failing to react to it in any systematic
way because we are uncertain about the agent’s integrity; but let us discount this
possibility for the sake of illustration.) Now suppose that, before pointing, the agent
had used facial gestures to signal willingness to engage in joint action with us and
that we had exploited the your-goal-is-my-goal inference. Then we would believe,
perhaps mistakenly, that a goal of the pointing action was to retrieve the food. In
which case the pointing action would have been no less helpful in enabling us to
succeed than the failed reach—which, as you may recall, was very helpful. So the
your-goal-is-my-goal inference can enable a goal ascriber to misunderstand pointing
actions as something like failed reaches. This means that, even without any deeper
understanding of communication, goal ascribers can respond appropriately to
helpful pointing actions in the context of joint action.
It is natural to suppose that the difficulty chimpanzees have in Hare and
Tomasello’s experiments with responding appropriately to helpful pointing but not
to failed reaching is due to a failure to understand communicative intention.23 What
we are suggesting is that participants must also have been unable or unwilling to
exploit the your-goal-is-my-goal inference.
Consider a related experiment by Leekam et al. (2010). Again participants had to
retrieve a reward from one of several closed containers, but this time they were 2-
and 3-year-old children. In one condition participants were shown an adult holding
up a replica of the target container. Leekam and colleagues found that when this
action was accompanied by an engaging facial expression, 3-year-old children were
significantly better at identifying the correct container compared to when the the
action was accompanied by a neutral facial expression (p. 116). Why did the
22 Note that although our discussion borrows an experimental paradigm, our aim is not to argue for
empirical hypotheses about chimpanzee social cognition. Our aim is only to argue for the theoretical
significance of interaction for mindreading by showing that your-goal-is-my-goal could in principle
enable individuals to make the transition from a simple understanding of goals to an early understanding
of communicative actions. Of course it would powerfully demonstrate the relevance of our theoretical
argument if we could provide evidence to show that this actually happens. But for now we are concerned
with more narrowly conceptual issues.
23 See footnote 15. Relatedly, in their discussion of these findings Moll and Tomasello suggest that ‘to
understand pointing, the subject needs to understand more than the individual goal-directed behaviour.
She needs to understand that by pointing towards a location, the other attempts to communicate to her
where a desired object is located; that the other tries to inform her about something that is relevant for
her’ (Moll & Tomasello, 2007, p. 6). Assuming this is right, our suggestion is that individuals could
reliably respond appropriately to pointing actions in the context of joint action without understanding
pointing.
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engaging facial expression enhance performance? The authors consider the idea that
engaging facial gestures somehow help children to understand communicative
intentions.24 An alternative possibility is that children succeeded without understand
the replica as a sign at all. Instead they may have associated the replica with the
container it resembled (which by itself is not enough to motivate selecting this
container, of course), regarded the engaging facial gestures as expressing
willingness to engage in joint action, and exploited your-goal-is-my-goal to infer
that a goal of the action of holding up the replica was to find the reward. In this way
they might have understood (or misunderstood) the action of holding up the replica
as like a failed reach in being an attempt to retrieve the reward.
So far we have illustrated how your-goal-is-my-goal enables responding appro-
priately to communicative gestures with two examples, pointing and holding up a
replica. The pattern of reasoning generalises to a wider range of communicative
gestures including single-word utterances. The basic requirement is this: in a particular
context, the goal ascriber must associate a communicative gesture with its referent. For
instance, she must associate the pointing gesture with the object indicated; or, if (say)
she is looking to see who has an object she must associate an utterance of ‘daddy’ with
the daddy.25 As we saw, outside the context of joint action, merely associating a
gesture with its referent falls short of being able to respond appropriately. But if a
mindreader supposes that her target is attempting to engage in joint action with her,
then she may infer that the goal of her target’s action is her goal and so be motivated to
treat the thing associated with a communicative gesture as relevant to the goal of her
own actions. This will reliably (but not always) enable her to respond appropriately to
the communicative gesture even without understanding it as a communicative gesture.
And once she has experienced how that communicative gesture works as a tool for
guiding others’ actions in the context of joint action, she may be in a position to realise,
further, that the same tool can be used in other contexts.
This, in barest outline, is how possessing abilities to engage in joint action means
that an individual with an ability to ascribe simple goals only and no understanding
of communicative intent might nevertheless reliably respond appropriately to some
communicative gestures, and so come be in a position to understand how such
gestures can be used to guide others’ actions.26 Of course we have only argued that
24 Leekam et al. (2010, p. 118): ‘the adults social cues conveyed her communicative intent, which in turn
encouraged the child to see through the sign…helping them to take a dual stance to it.’
25 Such associations appear to be in place by six months of age or earlier (Tincoff & Jusczyk, 1999,
2011). There is debate on when infants are first able to rapidly associate words with novel objects (Werker
et al., 1998; Friedrich & Friederici, 2011). Interestingly, a possible developmental decalage separating
two measures of whether infants have formed a word-object association, preferential looking and
comprehension as measured by reaching in response to a request (Gurteen et al., 2011), may suggest that
infants can form a word-object association before they can comprehend communicative actions involving
the word.
26 Contrast Csibra’s claim that, early in human development, goal ascription (‘teleological understand-
ing’ in his terms) and identifying the referents of communicative gestures (‘referential understanding’)
‘rely on different kinds of action understanding’ and are initially two distinct ‘action interpretation
systems’ (Csibra, 2003, p. 456). We have not shown that this claim wrong. But we have shown that there
is another possibility: referential understanding may emerge from the teleological understanding together
with abilities to engage in simple forms of joint action.
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this transition is theoretically possible; we have not attempted to defend any
hypothesis about anything’s actual evolution or development. But widening the
evidential basis for goal ascription to include facts about interactions between
mindreaders and their targets does reveal the coherence of novel hypotheses about a
role for interaction in the emergence of communicative gestures.
8 Observing interaction
We have been assuming that the your-goal-is-my-goal inference is available to
interacting mindreaders only. This is required for our argument that an interacting
mindreader could be in a position to know things she would be unable to know were
she a mere observer. We note, however, that a mere observer can use a related
inference.27 To illustrate, return once more to our example of a novice parent who,
struggling to get his twin pram onto a bus, is about to act jointly with a stranger.
Now consider a third person observing the novice parent and the stranger. Suppose
this third person can manifestly only observe what happens. Even so, she might
know that the stranger is about to attempt to engage in joint action with the parent,
and she might come to know this in roughly the way that the parent does.
To generalise, the following inference characterises a route to knowledge of
others’ goals which could be exploited by a mere observer:
1. She is about to attempt to engage in some joint action or other with him.
2. This is the single goal to which his actions will be directed.
Therefore:
3. A goal of her actions will be his goal, the goal to which his actions will be
directed.
Call this inference her-goal-is-his-goal. This inference shows that mere observers
who understand interaction also have a route to knowledge of others’ goals that
avoids the problem of opaque means. The significance of interaction for
mindreading extends beyond cases in which the mindreader herself interacts.
Is this an objection to our claim that an interacting mindreader could be in a
position to know things she would be unable to know were she a mere observer? No,
for the above inference differs from the earlier your-goal-is-my-goal inference in
requiring knowledge of another’s goal. The second premise makes this explicit.
Where your-goal-is-my-goal depends on a mindreader’s knowing to which goal her
own actions will be directed, this inference depends on the mindreader’s knowing to
which goal another’s actions will be directed. Now there could be—and surely
are—cases where a mindreader knows to which goals her own actions are directed
even though if another were to act as she is acting, mimicking her movements, she
would be unable to recognise the goal to which these actions are directed. So there
could be situations where an interacting mindreader could exploit your-goal-is-my-
goal even though if she were only observing she would be unable to exploit her-
goal-is-his-goal. This is sufficient to support our claim that an interacting
27 Here we are indebted to an anonymous referee.
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mindreader could be in a position to know things she would be unable to know were
she only observing.
9 The problem of false belief
So far we have been arguing that interaction can matter for goal ascription because
it makes available routes to knowledge of the goals of others’ actions which avoid
the problem of opaque means. There is another reason for supposing that interaction
matters for goal ascription and (at least indirectly) for mindreading more generally.
To introduce this reason we must first describe another problem affecting goal
ascription, the problem of false belief.
Recall that the problem of opaque means occurs when mindreaders must rely
entirely on observation and cannot identify to which ends actions are means (see
Sect. 3). A yet more familiar problem affecting goal ascription arises from the
interdependence of beliefs and goals. To illustrate, imagine sitting at a table. On the
table are two closed opaque boxes. One box contains an owl, the other a cat. If the
goal of your action is to retrieve the cat, and you believe that the cat is in the north
box, then (unless things are going very badly) you will reach for the north box. But
of course if you had believed instead that the cat was in the south box, then, in
acting with the same goal, you would have reached for the south box. Now consider
Ayesha who is observing your actions. Suppose Ayesha has sufficient reason to
believe, falsely, that you know the cat is in the south box. Then she may be justified
in supposing, incorrectly, that the goal of your action, in reaching for the north box,
is to retrieve the owl. As this illustrates, differences in belief between observers and
protagonists can impair goal ascription when the goal ascriber is unaware of those
differences. Call this the problem of false belief.
The your-goal-is-my-goal route to knowledge sometimes enables mindreaders to
avoid the problem of false belief. To illustrate consider a counterfactual alternative
to the above example. Ayesha dislikes the owl and is concerned with retrieving the
cat. As you reach for the north box, your facial gestures signal willingness to engage
in joint action with Ayesha. She then concludes, correctly, that your goal is her goal,
to retrieve the cat. So despite the difference in belief, the possibility of interaction
may mean that Ayesha can knowledgeably identify the goal of your action.
Exploiting your-goal-is-my-goal does not make it possible to avoid the problem
of false belief entirely, it only shifts the problem. To illustrate, in the above example
Ayesha’s ability to correctly identify the goal of your action depends on your
correctly anticipating the goals of her actions—on your knowing that she is
concerned with retrieving the cat. If you incorrectly anticipated that her actions
would be directed to retrieving the owl, Ayesha would have been mistaken in taking
your actions to be directed to retrieving the cat. As this indicates, exploiting your-
goal-is-my-goal can shift both which differences in belief have the potential to
impair goal ascription and also who needs to be aware of those differences. This is a
second illustration of how the possibility of interaction may enable even individuals
with only limited insights into others’ minds and actions to exploit reciprocity in
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mindreading—to exploit the fact that their targets are sometimes themselves
mindreading the mindreaders.
In short, then, abilities to engage in joint action make available a route to
knowledge of the goals of other agents’ actions which does not depend on the goal
ascriber knowing what her target believes even when their beliefs relevantly
differ.28 This is not because abilities to engage in joint action provide a way to avoid
the problem of false beliefs altogether. Rather they shift the burden of resolving the
problem of false belief from a goal ascriber to her target. This is potentially valuable
for those who have limited insight into their targets’ beliefs, or who lack abilities to
track differences in belief altogether.
10 Conclusion
Our aim was to show that interaction can facilitate mindreading in this sense: some
routes to knowledge are closed to mindreaders who rely exclusively on observation
but open to interacting mindreaders. In pursuing this aim we focused on interactions
which are joint actions. Our suggestion was this. Where a mindreader recognizes
that her target is about to attempt to engage in joint action with her and where the
mindreader is unwilling to change which goals her own actions will be directed to,
she may be in a position to know that the goals of her target’s actions will be the
goals of her own actions. This is the your-goal-is-my-goal route to knowledge (see
Sect. 5).
To show that this route to knowledge is potentially valuable, we argued that it
enables mindreaders to overcome two problems, the problem of opaque means and
the problem of false belief. These problems may rarely arise for human adults
thanks to sophisticated linguistic communication and extensive knowledge of how
things can be achieved. But interest in the evolution or development of mindreading
motivates focusing on those with absent or fledgling communicative skills, limited
insight into others’ minds and narrow knowledge of how things work. For such
individuals the problems of opaque means and false beliefs may easily arise,
particularly in cases involving novel tools and communicative gestures. Both
problems can be overcome by exploiting the your-goal-is-my-goal route to
knowledge. It follows that expertise with tools and communicative gestures does
not presuppose knowledge of others’ intentions and beliefs. This shows that it is
coherent to suppose that expertise with tools or communicative gestures (or both),
far from presupposing sophisticated forms of mindreading, might instead play a role
in explaining their emergence in evolution or development.
How might this work? Here is a wild conjecture about a path from simple forms
of interaction to sophisticated forms of mindreading. We have seen that abilities to
ascribe goals to actions together with abilities to engage in simple forms of joint
action involving distributive goals may be sufficient to explain how individuals
28 The her-goal-is-his-goal inference (see Sect. 8) shows that mindreaders who only observe may also be
able to exploit a route to knowledge of the goal of another agent’s actions which does not depend on
knowing what that agent believes but rather on knowing what a further agent interacting with the first
believes.
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come to productively misunderstand communicative gestures in the context of joint
action (see Sect. 7). This might be a step towards responding appropriately to, and
using, communicative gestures in other contexts, which might then play a role in
explaining how early forms of communication emerge. But we know that early,
non-linguistic forms of communication are essential for the later appearance of
linguistic communication, and abilities to communicate by language in turn appear
to play an important role in the development (at least) of sophisticated forms of
mindreading.29 Now clearly this wild conjecture is not one that we have provided
any reason for accepting. Our point in mentioning it is merely to illustrate how
better understanding the roles of interaction in goal ascription and mindreading
more generally might eventually lead to discoveries on how sophisticated forms of
cognition emerge from conceptually and cognitively undemanding forms of
interaction. Take cultures of tool use, the flexible use of communicative gestures,
or insight into interpersonal differences in belief and other mental states: if any or
all of these originate in abilities to interact, then we need to know how interaction
could lead to their emergence. And one small step towards acquiring this knowledge
might just be understanding how interacting mindreaders could come to know
things which they might not have been able to know if they were only observing.
References
Apperly, I. A. (2010). Mindreaders: The cognitive basis of ‘‘theory of mind’’. Hove: Psychology Press.
Apperly, I. A., & Butterfill, S. (2009). Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like
states?. Psychological Review, 116(4), 953–970.
Astington, J., & Baird, J. A. (eds) (2005). Why language matters for theory of mind. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Baillargeon, R., Scott, R. M., & He, Z. (2010). False-belief understanding in infants. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 14(3), 110–118.
Bratman, M. (1992). Shared cooperative activity. The Philosophical Review, 101(2), 327–341.
Bratman, M. (1993). Shared intention. Ethics, 104, 97–113.
Bratman, M. (1999) I intend that we j. In Faces of intention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
(1999)
Butterfill, S. (2012). Joint action and development. Philosophical Quarterly, 62(246), 23–47.
Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2005). What chimpanzees know about seeing revisited: An explanation of the
third kind. In N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. McCormack, J. Roessler (Eds.), Joint attention: Communication
and other Minds. (pp. 45–64). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carpenter, M. (2009). Just how joint is joint action in infancy. Topics in Cognitive Science, 1(2),
380–392.
Csibra, G. (2003). Teleological and referential understanding of action in infancy. Philosophical
Transactions: Biological Sciences, 358(1431), 447–458.
Csibra, G., Bı´ro´, S., Koo´s, O., & Gergely, G. (2003). One-year-old infants use teleological representations
of actions productively. Cognitive Science, 27(1), 111–133.
Csibra, G., & Gergely, G. (1998). The teleological origins of mentalistic action explanations: A
developmental hypothesis. Developmental Science, 1(2), 255–259.
Davidson, D. (1984). Inquiries into truth and interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davidson, D. (1990). The structure and content of truth. The Journal of Philosophy, 87(6), 279–328.
Dennett, D. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge: MIT Press.
29 A range of evidence is reviewed in contributions to Astington and Baird (2005).
Interacting mindreaders 861
123
Doherty, M. J. (2006). The development of mentalistic gaze understanding. Infant and Child
Development, 15, 179–186.
Friedrich, M., & Friederici, A. D. (2011). Word learning in 6-month-olds: fast encoding–weak retention.
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(11), 3228–3240.
Gergely, G., Nadasky, Z., Csibra, G., & Biro, S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of
age. Cognition, 56, 165–193.
Gilbert, M. (2009). Shared intention and personal intentions. Philosophical Studies, 144(1), 167–187.
Gurteen, P. M., Horne, P. J., & Erjavec, M. (2011). Rapid word learning in 13- and 17-month-olds in a
naturalistic two-word procedure: Looking versus reaching measures. Journal of Experimental Child
Psychology, 109(2), 201–217.
Hare, B., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2001). Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know?. Animal
Behaviour, 61(1), 139–151.
Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2004). Chimpanzees are more skilful in competitive than in cooperative
cognitive tasks. Animal Behaviour, 68(3), 571–581.
Hughes, C., Fujisawa, K. K., Ensor, R., Lecce, S., & Marfleet, R. (2006). Cooperation and conversations
about the mind: A study of individual differences in 2-year-olds and their siblings. British Journal of
Developmental Psychology, 24(1), 53–72.
Hughes, C., & Leekam, S. (2004). What are the links between theory of mind and social relations?
review, reflections and new directions for studies of typical and atypical development. Social
Development, 13(4), 590–619.
Knoblich, G., Butterfill, S., & Sebanz, N. (2010). Psychological research on joint action: Theory and data.
In B. Ross (Eds.), Psychology of Learning and Motivation, vol 51. Burlington: Academic Press.
Knoblich, G., & Sebanz, N. (2006). The social nature of perception and action. Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 15(3), 99–104.
Kutz, C. (2000). Acting together. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61(1), 1–31.
Leekam, S. R., Solomon, T. L., & Teoh, Y. (2010). Adults’ social cues facilitate young children’s use of
signs and symbols. Developmental Science, 13(1), 108–119.
Lewis, D. (1974). Radical interpretation. Synthese, 27(3–4), 331–344.
Liszkowski, U., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Twelve-month-olds communicate helpfully and
appropriately for knowledgeable and ignorant partners. Cognition, 108(3), 732–739.
Ludwig, K. (2007). Collective intentional behavior from the standpoint of semantics. Nous, 41(3),
355–393.
Miller, S. (2001). Social action: A teleological account. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Moll, H., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Cooperation and human cognition: the vygotskian intelligence
hypothesis. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 362(1480), 639–648.
O’Neill, D. K. (2005). Talking about ‘new’ information: The given/new distinction and children’s
developing theory of mind. In J. Astington & J. A. Baird (Eds.), Why language matters for theory of
mind. (pp. 84–105). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pacherie, E. (2011). Framing joint action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2(2), 173–192.
Penn, D. C., & Povinelli, D. J. (2007). On the lack of evidence that non-human animals possess anything
remotely resembling a ‘theory of mind’. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B,
362(1480), 731–744.
Povinelli, D. J. (2001). On the possibility of detecting intentions prior to understanding tem. In B.
F. Malle, L. Moses & D. A. Baldwin (Eds.), Intentions and intentionality. (pp. 225–248).
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Roth, A. S. (2004). Shared agency and contralateral commitments. The Philosophical Review, 113(3),
359–410.
Searle, J. R. (2002) Collective intentions and actions. In Consciousness and Language (pp. 90–105).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Sebanz, N., Bekkering, H., & Knoblich, G. (2006). Joint action: Bodies and mind moving together.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(2), 70–76.
Southgate, V., Johnson, M. H., & Csibra, G. (2008). Infants attribute goals even to biomechanically
impossible actions. Cognition, 107(3), 1059–1069.
Tincoff, R., & Jusczyk, P. W. (1999). Some beginnings of word comprehension in 6-month-olds.
Psychological Science, 10(2), 172–175.
Tincoff, R., & Jusczyk, P. W. (2011). Six-month-olds comprehend words that refer to parts of the body.
Infancy, 17(4), 432–444.
862 S. A. Butterfill
123
Tollefsen, D. (2005). Let’s pretend: Children and joint action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 35(75),
74–97.
Tomasello, M. (2008). Origins of human communication. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Tomasello, M., & Carpenter, M. (2007). Shared intentionality. Developmental Science, 10(1), 121–5.
Want, S., & Harris, P. (2001). Learning from other people’s mistakes: Causal understanding in learning to
use a tool. Child Development, 72(2), 431–443.
Warneken, F., Hare, B., Melis, A. P., Hanus, D., & Tomasello, M. (2007). Spontaneous altruism by
chimpanzees and young children. PLoS Biol, 5(7), e184.
Wellman, H. M., & Phillips, A. T. (2001). Developing intentional understandings. In B. F. Malle, L.
Moses & D. A. Balin (Eds.), Intentions and intentionality. (pp. 225–248). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Werker, J. F., Cohen, L. B., Lloyd, V. L., Stager, C., & Casasola, M. (1998). Acquisition of word-object
associations by 14-month-old infants. Developmental Psychology, 34(6), 1289–1309.
Wimmer, H., & Mayringer, H. (1998). False belief understanding in young children: Explanations do not
develop before predictions. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 22(2), 403–422.
Woodward, A. L. (1998). Infants selectively encode the goal object of an actor’s reach. Cognition, 69,
1–34.
Interacting mindreaders 863
123
